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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DORIS E. WELLS,

Plaintiff-R.espondent,
-vs.-

No. 8015

RAY A. WELLS,

Defendant-A pp·ellant.

PLAINTIFF -RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
FACTS
Doris vVells and Ray Wells were married in Watertown, New York, on April 4, 1943. One child, Dorothy,
was born to them. The only place they lived together
as husband and wife was in the State of New York. Ray
left New York State about June 25, 1949 to go to Reno,
Nevada to obtain a divorce from Doris. When his bus
reached Elko, Nevada, he got off the bus because he happened to think of a friend of his who lived there. After
establishing a six weeks' residence he obtained a divorce.
In his complaint for divorce (R. 12) he prayed for a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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decree of divorce without requesting that any provision
be made for the support of either his wife or his minor
child, but he did pray generally "for such other and further orders as shall be meet and proper in the premises."
The only service obtained on Doris Wells was in New
York State (R. 16). She never made her appearance in
the Nevada court. The Nevada court granted Ray Wells
a decree of divorce, but in the decree also ordered Ray to
pay $35.00 per month for the support of his minor child.
The decree reads as follows:
"That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing between plaintiff and defendant be,
and the same hereby are, forever dissolved, and
the said parties be, and they hereby are, restored
to the status of single persons ; that the plaintiff
is ordered to pay unto the defendant for the support and maintenance of the minor child the sum
of $35.00 per month, commencing on the 1st day
of November, 1949, and payable on the first day of
each and every month thereafter until such time
as the said minor child shall reach the age of
majority, or until such time as she shall marry
or become self-supporting or until the further
order of this Court."

.

This decree of divorce was entered on October 6,
1949 in Elko, Nevada. Two days later in Elko, Nevada,
Ray Wells married .Adeline Brown of Gouverneur, New
York, whom he had known while he was residing in New
York State. On October 10, 1949, he and the new Mrs.
Wells came to Salt Lake City, stopping for a while in a
hotel, then secured employment in Salt Lake City, and
he and the new Mrs. Wells became residents of Salt Lake
City, Utah.
2
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Ray \Yells did not 1nake any payments ordered by the
Nevada court for the support of his minor child. lie
has not paid a single installment (R. 71). The minor
child Dorothy was provided for by her mother. After
four years had elapsed, Doris learned of Ray Wells'
whereabouts and requested counsel to bring an action
to recover from Ray Wells the monies she had expended
for rearing Dorothy, and asked the court to make an
allowance for Dorothy's future support and also to secure
alimony for herself.

On June 6, 1952, Doris Wells' counsel filed such a
complaint in two causes of action ( R. 1). The theory
of the complaint was that while the Nevada decree might
be operative to dissolve the 1narriage bond, no appearance having been made in the Nevada court, the decree
of the Nevada court could not settle the property rights
of the parties nor be an adjudication of the wife's or the
child's right to alimony (R. 2, paragraphs 5 and 6). The
plaintiff here pleaded what in her opinion was the legal
effect of the Nevada decree.
The defendant then answered and he too pleaded
what in his opinion was the legal effect of the Nevada
decree.
COURT PROCEEDINGS
Thus both parties put before the court the question
of determining the legal effect of the Nevada decree.
With the pleadings in that state, there was presented to the court from the beginning the facts with
respect to the Nevada decree, and the pleadings consist-
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ing of the complaint and the answer required the Utah
court to rule on what the effect of the Nevada decree
was. This is made rnore apparent by a quotation from the
defendants Amended Answer. The defendant's Answer
pleaded the Nevada decree of divorce and then the defendant continued his amended answer and pleaded the
legal effect of that decree in these words (R. 2):
"That as a result thereof, defendant secured a
Decree of Divorce from plaintiff upon good and
sufficient grounds in conformance with the laws
of the State of Nevada. A copy of said decree
of divorce has heretofore been filed with the court
in this matter and cause, and the same is hereby
specifically incorporated into and by this reference made a part hereof."
The validity of this decree of divorce was therefore before the court with or without the plaintiff's reply to the
Amended Answer (R. 19).
The case went to trial on March 9, 1953 (R. 41). The
trial proceeded as was suggested by this court in the case
of Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353,179 Pac. 2,1005, namely,
to try the question of whether Ray Wells had established
a domicile in Nevada so that the decree of the Nevada
court would be considered a valid decree of divorce. The
court then indicated that he would find that Ray Wells
had established a valid residence in the State of Nevada
and that the Nevada decree was a complete adjudication of the marriage status of the parties, and furthermore, "that the decree so entered was valid and binding
upon both parties to this action." This amounted to a
4
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finding in favor of the defendant upholding the defendant and ascribing to the Nevada decree the same legal
effect that the defendant had ascribed to it, holding that
the decree was binding upon the plaintiff as to her own
support and in addition as to child support.
.. 2. Tliat the decree of divorce entered in the
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in
and for the State of Nevada, in and for the County
of Elko, on October 6, 1949, is a binding and valid
decree of divorce, binding upon both parties, and
that the order contained in the said decree of divorce herein set forth is valid and binding upon
both parties hereto, to-wit:
" 'IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: That the bonds
of matrunony now and heretofore existing between plaintiff and defendant be, and the
same hereby are, restored to the status of
single persons; that the plaintiff I ordered
to pay unto the defendant for the support
and maintenance of the minor child the sum
of $35.00 per inonth, commencing on the 1st
day of November, 1949, and payable on the
first day of each and every month thereafter
until such time as the said minor child shall
reach the age of majority, or until such time
as she shall n1arry or become self-supporting,
or until the further order of this court.'" (R.
42, paragraph 2).
The Court having concluded' that the Nevada decree
was valid as set forth in Paragraph 2 of the court's order,
need not have done anything more since this Paragraph
2 already set up the Nevada decree as a decree of the
Utah court. However, the court was of the opinion that

5
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some additional pleading should appear to permit the
court to enter a judgment for the support money that
had accrued and the court then added Paragraph 4 to
this order of March 18th (R. 43):
"4. That this court having denied the plaintiff herein the right to recover ali1nony or support
money in an independent action for the reason
that this court is of the opinion that the aforementioned decree of the Nevada court is valid and
binding upon the parties to this action, not only
insofar as it affects the marriage status, but also
insofar as it affects the award of support money
for the support of the minor child of the parties
hereto, and fails to award support for the support of the plaintiff in this action, the plaintiff
herein is hereby permitted to file an amended and
supplemental complaint setting forth a cause of
action based upon the aforementioned Nevada
decree in order to recover support money for the
support of the said minor child."
POINT 1
PLAINTIFF CONTENDS THAT THE VALIDITY OF
THE NEVADA DECREE WAS IN ISSUE WITHOUT
THE FILING OF THE REPLY AND THAT THE
ENTRY OF THE ORDER UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE NEVADA DECREE WAS PROPER
WITHOUT THE FILING OF A SUPPLEMENTAL
COMPLAINT.

Both the plaint~ff and the defendant referred to the
Nevada decree and the defendant particularly relied upon it and invoked the judgment of this court on the question of the validity of that decree. That much was accomplished by the filing of the complaint by the plaintiff
and the answer by the defendant. The only decision made

6
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by this court i~ that the Nevada decree is valid not onl~·
to dissolYe the 1narital status but also is binding upor1
the plaintiff on her right to receive alimony for her own
support and the right to receive support money for the
support of the 1ninor child. A decision on that matter
was invoked without the filing of the supplemental and
amended complaint. That issue was not brought into the
case by the filing of the supplemental complaint because
as pointed out hereinabove, that issue was decided even
before the filing of the amended and supplemental complaint. (SeeR. 43, paragraph 4, quoted above.)
Similarly, the judg1nent of the district court as to
the effect of the Nevada decree was invoked by the plaintiff when she filed her complaint, and also by the defendant when he filed his answer. In that state of the plead-.
ings the judgment of the court was required as to the
effect of the N·evada judgment or whether it had any
effect at all. The reply filed by the plaintiff only gave,
notice to the defendant that the plaintiff would contend
that the Nevada decree was not entitled to be given any
effect on account of the wife's claim that the husband
had not established a bona fide residence in Nevada. The
reply only gave the defendant notice of a specific point of
law on which plaintiff would rely. When plaintiff filed
the reply, it was plaintiff's view that the filing of the
reply would put th~ defendant on definite notice that
one of the reasons for denying any effect to the Nevada
decree would he that the husband had not established
a bona fide domicile in Nev~da. Instead of objecting to
this notice, the defendant should have appreciated the
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fact that specific notice was given to him of a law point
that would be raised.
Accordingly, the reply did not change the theory of
the original complaint nor did the amended complaint
change the theory of the original complaint. Indeed, it
might be said that the amended and supplemental complaint was surplusage.
POINT 2
SINCE THE NEVADA DECREE HAS BEEN UPHELD AS A JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT, PLAINTIFF YIELDS TO THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER COURT AND DOES NOT SEEK FURTHER
RELIEF.

While counsel for the plaintiff is of the opinion that
an independent action for alimony is permissible where
the wife has not had her day in court, plaintiff now asks
this court to sustain the judgment already entered. This
gives the plaintiff but "half a loaf" but plaintiff is content
with that judgment rather than further litigate the question as to whether plaintiff is entitled to recover alimony
and support money in an independent action. In the interests of the needs of the plaintiff, counsel for the plaintiff is praying for this court's affirmance of the judgment
already entered. Many issues were brought into this
case in the lower court that tended to obscure the single
fact that a child of tender years was seeking nominal
support money from a father who had traveled 2500 miles
to avoid his paternal duty. While success upon the crossappeal might enable this child and perhaps her mother
to secure better support at this late date, we shall be content with the affirmance of the judgment of the lower
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court. To bring a bigger judgment to a person in need,
but to bring it a year or more later, is but little comfort
to that person in need. \Yhile the plaintiff relied upon
the Utah case of Hu.tton v. Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 198 Pac.
165, to give the wife her day in court to secure an adjudication upon her right to alimony and an independent
judg1nent on the amount of support money to be paid for
the support of the minor child, plaintiff is content to
abandon that position in this action. Counsel for the
plaintiff privately retains the opinion that the better reasoned cases allowing a wife who has not been before the
court which granted the divorce an independent cause of
action, and counsel hopes that that matter might be ruled
upon by this court in some other case in which the question might be raised.
POINT 3
DEFENDANT SEEKS TO AVOID THIS JUDGMENT
BY STATING THAT PLAINTIFF HAD AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY UNDER THE "UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCE MEN OF SUPPORT ACT."

Defendant's counsel consistently urged the district
court to require the wife to reply upon the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. The plain answer is that the act states that that remedy is not an
exclusive remedy to the wife or child who has been abandoned by her husband. Section 77-61-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 reads :
"Remedies cumulative. The remedies herein
provided are in addition to and not in substitution
for any remedies now existing, and shall in no way
effect or impair any other remedy, civil or criminal, under the laws of this state."
9
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff urges the court to affirm the judgment entered so that the defendant will be compelled to contribute nominally to the support of his minor child, now
about ten years of age, to whose support he has not contributed for more than five years. All that the lower
court has done is to giv·e full faith and credit to the judgment of the Nevada court and held that the Nevada decree adjudicates all of the matters of property, and not
only the question of marital status. The defendant in
effect is asking this court to deny full faith and credit
to a judgment of a sister state, which judgment was entered in an ex parte proceeding brought by the defendant
and in which proceedings the defendant was the moving
party in bringing about the entry of the judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
WHITE, ARNOVITZ AND SMITH,
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
913 First Security Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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